View from Manila: Understanding the US Typhon missile launcher

MANILA, Philippines – It’s rare to see President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. lose his cool in public, especially when it comes to issues concerning China. So there was a mix of surprise, glee, and fascination when he lashed out at Beijing for its insistence that the United States’ Typhon Missile System should be pulled out of the Philippines.

Here’s what Marcos said in a press interview on the sidelines of a visit to Cebu on January 30: “I don’t understand their comments on the Typhon Missile System. We don’t make any comments on their missile system, and their missile systems are a thousand times more powerful than what we have.”

Beijing has claimed that the Philippines was “creating tensions and antagonism in the region and inciting geopolitical confrontation and an arms race” by welcoming America’s Mid-Range Capability missile system and allowing its continued stay and movement in the country.

Marcos then offered a “deal:” China should “stop claiming our territory, stop harassing our fishermen and let them have a living, stop ramming our boats, stop water cannoning our people, stop firing lasers at us, and stop your aggressive and coercive behavior,” and the Typhon can go back to the US.

There’s been a slew of reactions on social media, including a handful that seem to think it was a serious offer on Marcos’ part — for the Typhon Missile System to return to the US, as long as China stopped harassing civilians and government personnel, and pulls out of the West Philippine Sea. It’s not.

It’s the Philippines, through Marcos, simply calling China out for its double-talk.

China’s arsenal has been growing steadily in the past years. The Pentagon, in a December 2024 report to the US Congress, estimated that China is likely to grow its stockpile of nuclear warheads to 1,000 by 2030. The Asian giant’s advanced and longer-range conventional missile systems has also been growing, making the US conclude that China has “[improved] its readiness for long-range precision strikes on US and allied forces and bases throughout much of the Indo-Pacific.”

What’s in the Typhon?

Talk of the Typhon’s extended stay on Philippine soil comes hand in hand with repeated announcements from Philippine defense and security officials that Manila intends to acquire its own Typhon Missile System — or at least a typhon-like system — as part of its military modernization efforts.

These announcements shouldn’t be seen as an immediate acquisition plan — or even an inevitability.

After all, there’s funding to think about (P15 billion was slashed from the military’s modernization budget for 2025, to start); there’s the US’s compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime; as well as permissions from the United States (the executive, and in many cases, its Congress too)

The Typhon, or MRC Launcher, was first brought to the Philippines and deployed in April 2024 to Ilocos Norte, which has a coastline that spans the West Philippine Sea and waters facing Taiwan, for the bilateral army-to-army Salaknib exercises.

The transport of the launcher — its battery operations center, launchers, primer movers, and modified trailers — was also an activity in the flagship bilateral military exercise Balikatan 2024. Ilocos Norte is also the President’s home province.

The Typhon has since been deployed to a new, undisclosed location.

What’s in the Typhon, and why is China making so much noise over it?

The US Army Pacific said its 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1MDTF)’s Typhon can fire both the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). The SM-6 is a “multi-mission missile capable of anti-air warfare, terminal ballistic missile defense, and anti-ship strike roles” with a range of 370 kilometers, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)’s Missile Defense Project.

The Tomahawk, meanwhile, is an “intermediate-range, subsonic cruise missile” that’s typically launched from US Navy ships or submarines. “The Tomahawk can carry either conventional or nuclear payloads, though policy decisions have phased out their nuclear role,” according to the CSIS project. It has a range of 1,250 to 2,500 kilometers.

In contrast, the Philippines’ newly-acquired export variant BrahMos missiles have a flight range of only up to 290 kilometers, in compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Relative to Ilocos Norte’s capital of Laoag, Taipei is at least 760 kilometers away, Sansha City (through which China says it administers the features it claims in the South China Sea) is over 885 kilometers away. Mainland China is just a little over 800 kilometers away from the city of Laoag.

The deployment is the message

When the Typhon first came to the Philippines, then-1MDTF commander Bernard Harrington touted it as a “significant step in our partnership with the Philippines.” Sources have indicated that its deployment then — and its continued stay now — is a convergence of mutual interests.

The Philippines has long needed to play catch-up, especially since it’s supposed to pivot to external defense under the Marcos administration. The US, after all, has been working with Japan to create a joint military plan for a “Taiwan contingency” — or the possibility of Chinese President Xi Jinping forcing Taiwan unification.

Kyodo News reported in November 2024 that the plan would include the deployment of missile units to Japan’s southwestern Kagoshima and Okinawa prefectures, as well as to the Philippines.

The Typhon’s stay and apparent tour of the Philippines also sends a clear message to Beijing — that Washington’s “iron clad” commitment includes embarking the MRC on a 8,000-mile journey and devoting personnel to continue training their Filipino counterparts.

This is not aid, nor is it a Hail Mary. It’s about serving the converging interests of a Western superpower and its smaller, strategic ally in the region.

‘Flowers for Xi’

The strides and steps in the US-Philippine bilateral relationship are only a part of a larger effort by Manila to expand its bilateral and multilateral ties, especially when it comes to defense and trade.

Teodoro, in a late January 2025 interview with Hoover Senior Fellow H.R. McMaster, said the only way for the Philippines-US bilateral relationship to “break momentum” is if “[China] changes its behavior.” He explained: “I mean, if China didn’t do what it is doing now, not only in the West Philippine Sea, but in the Sea of Japan or in the East Sea for that matter, there would be no need for all of these alliance-building mechanisms.”

“A lot of what we have been doing, it’s because of their actions which threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our country,” Teodoro added.

Are the Philippines’ actions — in defense, security, and diplomacy — done solely in response to Chinese actions?

To a big extent, yes. It’s difficult to be a few steps ahead of a superpower that has apparently long-deployed espionage operatives in sensitive locations in the Philippines, and has the advantage of sheer maritime might in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Yet, it has to be more than that. Marcos himself told security officials and experts at the Shangri-La that countries in Asia “are not mere bystanders to unfolding world events.” He stressed that, “We are the actors that drive those events. We are the main characters in our collective story. We are the owners of the narratives of our regional community.”

Life and circumstances happen to bit players. Main characters drive the plot forward.

So in being the home of the Typhon for over a year now and pushing back on Beijing’s pushback, what sort of role is shaping up for the Philippines? – Rappler.com